Capacity and Reaction Functions of Joint-Stock Firms

Document Type: Original Research

Author

Institute for Basic Economic Science, Osaka, Japan

Abstract

This paper investigates two-stage competition with two joint-stock firms. In the first stage, each firm independently chooses a level of capacity. In the second stage, each firm independently chooses an output. The paper shows that each firm’s reaction function has a kink at its installed capacity level. In addition, the paper considers interactions between a joint-stock incumbent and a potential joint-stock entrant as well as a pair of established joint-stock firms. The paper demonstrates that there exist cases in which the joint-stock incumbent can deter entry by the potential joint-stock entrant.

Keywords


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